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Two can play this game

31 replies on “Two can play this game”

People will not close their amazon acct for the good reason it actually provides a good and needed service.
And the cloud supply is probably just a small attachment on the thing most people with account never have contact.

Yeah, its pretty awful what they do to parlor, but P can probably find a different service — and if not, the relevant action is to crate one. Those 80M people could be put to better use CREATING the stuff that now appears in the wrong hands and makes a practical monopoly.
A cloud service is not even something that needs big research — the bulk is just the ton of hardware you can buy.
And P does not need a “cloud service” in the first place, could just use a dedicated server park and be independent.
I’m way more concerned with the internet services, if those allowed to pick by politics, then it’s not much different than roads would start allowing cars based on affiliation. Hopefully there are some laws in effect against discrimination.

People could stop their Prime or KU, etc. and only buy what they absolutely can’t get anywhere else.
Yes, we need to start creating stuff ourselves. Our govt. sold our jobs to overseas and now (with few exceptions) we are a country of food service, services, trucking, and gig/online. With the lockdowns, this is getting worse too.
We still need to hit AMZ where it hurts. $$

Parler et al users have to be willing to pay for these dedicated servers.Gab is funded by users. Also, the means of payment are also being censored, in that pay pal and patreon forbid accounts from those with select POV or ideologies. Things are more encumbered that you think they are.

This is the problem with the current format of the internet. The high bandwidth sites and services that we’re used to, essentially run on servers and infrastructure owned by large companies. Many of these are now so tied up with the left’s viewpoints that the bulk of the internet that we see and use is now restricted and censored.

Good Morning Jack,
That’s actually not quite so true anymore actually. The Cloud Based Servers of today can be assigned and charged solely on an as-needed bases, paying only for what you use. Also, the encryption methods used now days, it is actually possible to hold your server and data information in such a way that it is completely inaccessible nor even known what is in it by the very hosts of the servers.
The only real access the hosts would have is simply to shut it down, to which there are even methods available that would allow for multiple hosting of different providers.
A very interesting story on this would have been an organization called Piratebay that the government had a very very very hard time shutting down as it kept popping up all over the place and making them start very lengthy and difficult tracking methods each time they shut it down again, only to have it pop up again within an hour or so.

What you say on “completely inaccessible” is not really true for the practice: if you use the cloud *service* then you are vulnerable. You can store only encrypted stuff that never gets decrypted in sight, but then all you use is data storage space.
Okay, I could designb some work in the service that is fine to do, but it is so minimal the service would be only a complication without benefits.

Good Afternoon to you Pat,
Actually, now days, the Cloud Based Servers are themselves also completely shrouded in an encryption envelope. It is a little like seeing a ‘box’ is there but not knowing exactly what is in it. Network traffic being a little like pipes going into the box, but not knowing what that traffic is. The only thing server farm administrators would know is the amount of traffic in/out, the memory used, and the processor usage.
If done correctly, it is quite possible to have a Cloud Based Server without the host knowing what is on it nor what it is doing. In fact, that is a very common configuration now.
The points of vulnerability would be your own user name at the service provider. For example, if they knew Bill Whittle was the customer, it might be a good guess to figure out what might be inside the box.
The other point of vulnerability could also be the connection point, which does not need to have anything to do with the server system at all but act more as a traffic repeater. What is even more beautiful about such a method is that the repeater (it’s not really called a repeater, but just trying to keep terminology simple) can distribute the traffic evenly amongst the servers and even redirect traffic for when a server goes down.
The interesting thing about the repeater is that it is simpler to set up and re-setup over and over, as it is merely a pointer to the information, much like a traffic sign. All the hard stuff is still on the server.
Furthermore, servers now days can be easily set up for distributing the information, and in fact most professional server services themselves already do this on their own with their own equipment, placing such synchronizing servers in different country and/or geographically located locations.
While I wouldn’t suggest it, theoretically you could even have multiple servers being used in the same server farm and still an experienced person could have the server farm administrators scratching their heads about what to shut down.
A more vulnerable server now days is actually one that you would have in your own basement, as it could always be ceased, or your connection shut down, or even the power shut off.
Using the traffic redirection methods I outlined above however, you could also set up several physical servers on encrypted drives in multiple homes and achieve a similar result through traffic redirection to multiple member servers throughout the world.
If you have Windows 10 Professional, you can see a little bit of an example of this on their Hyper-V Terminal, where several different servers with different operating systems are working in their own box, but you do not necessarily have knowledge of what might be in the sessions, only that the session is running and how much in resources it is using.

The shroud does nothing against those who are inside.
And in the past we at least believed that you need to only fear your cloud provider — then the spectre attacks proved that you can even spy from a neighboring VM.
If you want to delude yourself, be my guest but please do not deceive others who have little knowledge on what is possible in the field. Especially when you base it on “if done correctly” where “done” is out of your control and even out of your sight.
And we were talking about protecting the data from others, not reliability, the latter is obviously easier to be done by pushing it everywhere.

There is no need to be offended. I work in the industry as a professional and am familiar with what I am talking about. I am not deluding others and there is no need for passive aggressiveness on the matter either.

Sure, you appear to be professional working for the service. While I am a professional working for the client. 🙂 So yeah, you are expected to sell the stuff, while I shall inform the customer what is under the wrap.
No offense, just business as usual.

Well, how about explaining to me the process that would be used from one VM to spy on another VM. Perhaps I am missing something… which is fine.

Assume the following:
Complete Server Encrypted Encapsulation… not just the drive, but the whole enchilada including the processes and memory. Basically a strongbox inside the host system. (not even the host processors know what is going on)
One port secured network encrypted communication entry from one remote location and all other connections blocked, and the block administered both from the internal server level as well as the host level, limited by restricted access from solely that remote location and only through single port encrypted network traffic. Basically one single tube coming out of the box and into the other box.
Keep in mind that the memory, processing, drive, cannot be accessed without the decryption code, and the only port of entry is a single network port (we’ll use port 443, just for ease of simplicity), which has no access to the processors, memory, nor operating system. Without the decryption code, the encapsulation looks like nothing more than gobbligook, and only the actual in/out message from the server is accessible from the single point of entry.
Assume you have no idea of the decryption key and it is not possible to get it.
While I have no doubt that possibly there might have been a VM to VM leak at some point, it is extremely unlikely that it did so under the circumstances I have provided. There would have to be a trojan involved at some point on the internal hosted system, which is not likely to happen through the communication restrictions I’ve stated, of which could also be blocked at the host level if set up as such.

Err, as a client of the cloud service, looking whether my data can be put on the rented VM and remain hidden from anyone by me, why on earth should I assume any of your list above?
When I build a threat model I assume what I can reasonably control or at least verify.
In my model anything that appears in plaintext on the VM is known by the provider.
What goes there encrypted and comes out that way is fine. As I said in my first msg, there are some applications for such setup. But they are very limited. Normally what people want to do with the service is to actually /work/ on the data that is there. What requires it being decrypted at some point, inside.
Without, it is a mere store or relay.
If your long description maps to this setup ()the number of ports, connections, administration strategy is utterly irrelevant) then yeah, it is fine from security perspective. But not very practical.
But it doesn’t sound that way really, more like you want to create additional VMs inside the VM that are supposedly encrypted — that is mere obfuscation. As in the encrypted form it will not work, and if the key is injected to decrypt for working, then it is not different from just not having the encryption in the first place.
And as a side note, if you are professional in the field you are /supposed/ to know about the problems like VM to VM leaks. At least to the level to confidently state how they got fixed and what scenarios are covered. Mights and hopes just not cut it.

That’s actually the direction the cloud has gone now. It’s actually a bunch of VMs inside of a VM type of deal (usually inside of another VM, and run by VM type of routers and switches). Not only that, it’s gone so far as to provide services run from dockets without their own server. It’s turned out much more efficient this way, as the resources are much more easily distributed and used to their max… but that is actually getting a little more complicated in explanation.
We did have one issue with our VMs back in, I think it was 2018? Or was it 2016? I don’t remember, really. It was just around the period before encapsulated encryption started getting used on a system-wide basis. That’s really the only thing I can think of.
I stand by my stance that, done properly and with people who know what they are doing, well trained, that the systems are not exposed to the host and the host has no ability to access without the key. But I am always open to discussion of where that is incorrect, as any good IT Professional learns exactly in that manner.
I have a pretty nifty system set up in my own home, but I focus more on keeping things small. Everyone in our IT Department always brags about how big and bad their stuff is, while I do the opposite and try to squeeze things out of something as small as a Raspberry. I’ll let them throw their money at big stuff which goes out of date within a few years, I myself like to make things small, cheap, and easy.

What you say is not “incorrect”, you just miss the connections on the threat model. Or more like the barriers, and try to draw connections across those.
Can I make a secure system from VMs? Yeah, sure, as in your “if done correctly”. Cuz that’s my HW, my setup, my operation. And it will work fine as long as I make sire the “if” holds.
But if instead I just purchase a black box VM service — it changes everything. Because then all I’m left with is that the provider pinky swears it will be fine. And I have no reason whatsoever to believe that he have either the capacity or the will.
Is that swear any different compared to the zillion instances who claimed they care so much about … and will never … then managed to leak millions of passwords and other sensitive data — or gave it to other parties as courtesy or outright sold it.
I’m pretty sure Amazon we discuss here made the pinky swear to run parlor as agreed, and not just pulling the plug fabricating an excuse. Openly. with such morals what holds them back from using all the data and programs the clients throw in their infrastructure? Even deliberately on the corp level.
But if they even deserved me thinking to be honest still it’s fairly easy to get inside access in secret and go around all your “done correctly” stuff. I have plenty of first hand experience with “secure area” of banks, and other big players with all interest to keep that area safe and secure. Well, in reality it’s full of wide holes. Why would the providers be any better protecting stuff not even their own?

Parlor now suppsedly has a “data breach”. IMHO it looks pretty much like their VM host just published the whole state of their servers along with snapshots from past time points.

I mean no offense when I say, I wouldn’t believe the mainstream media nor AWS if they told me that water is wet, nor what has been said on the ‘data breach’.
I’m more likely to believe that they were hacked by a government entity than believe that the encryption envelope was broken, which are two different things.

Pardon me for saying… nonsense. It is apparently you don’t know how it works. I mean no offense other than to state a fact and I honestly do apologize for any offending.

I am a senior engineer for a cloud services hardware and software company. I don’t like giving out the name, but it is under the umbrella of the world’s largest IT hardware and software brand. The discussion on clouds and VM’s and nested apps is irrelevant actually. If Amazon Web Services knows which servers are allocated to hosting Parler’s databases and front end apps, they can just go power those off. So a debate over VM’s is irrelevant. Fun reading! Thanks for contributing!! Cheers!

Supposedly Parler has until midnight tonight to decide on their “moderation” plan b4 AMZ drops them.
I honestly don’t believe much I see/read anymore.
Believe it when it happens. Then I’ll be skeptical. LOL

It is my hope that some of these websites might start looking more into using Progressive Web Apps for their programs instead of having stuff held in the ‘store’ for users.
By using PWAs instead, they can update and even move their apps constantly around without having to go through the approval processes of the ‘store’ and folks could even install the app on their phones without approval.
There are drawbacks to the usage of PWAs, but nothing that I can see that would prevent a program such as Parler.

Well, for the record… in case all this goes down…
You can find me on Frequency 151.940 Mhz. Or on repeater 147.045 Mhz for Northern Colorado. Or on CB Channel 3. Sorry, I don’t have a call sign yet, still studying for the test. I haven’t got a short-wave yet, but that should go well for replacing long-distance calling.
I believe there is another app called Telegram also, but I haven’t really checked it out yet. Just something to think about.

I am a senior engineer for a cloud services hardware and software company. I don’t like giving out the name, but it is under the umbrella of the world’s largest IT hardware and software brand. The discussion on clouds and VM’s and nested apps is irrelevant actually. If Amazon Web Services knows which servers are allocated to hosting Parler’s databases and don’t end apps, they can just go power those off. So a debate over VM’s is irrelevant. Fun reading! Thanks for contributing!! Cheers!

Correct. I believe that’s what my posting says too. I pointed out two points of vulnerability, and that was most definitely the first one I mentioned.
You gotta admit, there is a lot going on with those servers that they have no idea what it is. For example, I know they are being used for piracy, pornography, file sharing, the dark web, etc. and it is often difficult to pin point those areas.
I agree with you entirely and have no issue with any of it. I can say however that a mixture of different cloud providers, as well as a mixture of private servers, can make a very difficult target to take down.
And I agree… a good discussion.

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